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COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDIToR's NOTE.-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)
PARTITION-JUDGMENT OF THE PLEADINGS-QUIET TITLE
DECREE IMPROPER-NO. 12351-McLaughlin vs. Niles
Company-Decided December 8, 1930.
Facts.-Niles Company sued McLaughlin to partition
certain improved lots. McLaughlin filed answer denying
each and every allegation in the complaint and pleading an-
other suit pending between the same parties and with refer-
ence to the same cause of action. Court below rendered judg-
ment on the pleadings, quieting title but not decreeing par-
tition.
Held.-Such denial is not a denial that defendant denies
ownership in the property but only that defendant denies the
particular ownership alleged in the complaint and it is im-
proper to render judgment on the pleadings in such case.
While the Colorado statute gives to the court, in partition
proceedings, power to determine questions of conflicting title,
rights and interests of the parties, such determination is only
incidental to partition, and is not intended to perform the
functions of the Code action to quiet title.
Defendant should have been permitted to file an amended
answer upon his application therefor.
Judgment reversed 'with directions.
MECHANIC'S LIENSL--CESSATION OF WORK-TRIVIAL WORK-
No. 12718-The Boise-Payette Lumber Co. vs. Longwedel
et al-Decided December 8, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiff sought the enforcement of mechanic's
liens as against a deed of trust held by one of the defendants.
Plaintiff furnished the materials December 6, 1927, and was
assignee of one Collins, a plumber, who had practically com-
pleted his work prior to March 2, 1928, save to connect water
front in range on September 22, 1928. Both liens were filed
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November 2, 1928. The building was not actually completed
until November 1, 1928, but the owners had moved into it
some seven months before that date. All work ceased from
April 15th to July 5th of that year.
Held.-The cessation from labor came within the pro-
visions of Sec. 6450 C. L. 1921 and the last work of the
plumber in connecting water front was "trivial". The cessa-
tion of work on April 15th must be deemed equivalent to com-
pletion. The provisions of such statute constitute a limitation
on the time for filing liens. The liens were not filed in time.
Judgment affirmed.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-GENERAL AGENT-RELEASE OF
SURETY-No. 12153-Federal Surety Company vs. White
-Decided December 15, 1930.
Facts.-Defendant in error, plaintiff below, sued Surety
company on sub-contractor's bond for damages and recovered.
Defenses were that one Payne was a limited agent and not a
general agent and had no authority to waive certain conditions
of the bond and that surety company was released on the bond
because of certain advances made by plaintiff to the sub-
contractors and also because of certain acts of commission and
omission of the plaintiff and sub-contractors and that the pen-
alty of the bond being $20,000 that no judgment in excess
thereof could be entered.
Held.-A general agent is one who is authorized to do all
acts connected with a particular trade, business or employ-
ment and Payne was such general agent; the alleged acts of
commission and omission were not sufficient to invalidate the
bond; the surety company had notice of the alleged default
and had the opportunity under the bond to take over the com-
pletion of the project but it declined this privilege and ex-
pressly disclaimed responsibility with reference thereto; while
the judgment rendered against surety company was in excess of
the penalty in the bond, such excess only consisted of interest
and it was properly allowable.
Judgment affirmed.
DICTA
ATTORNEYS-DISBARMENT-PRACTICING WITHOUT A Li-
CENSE-NO. 12718-People etc. vs. Castleman-Decided
December 15, 1930.
Facts.-Castleman appeared as counsel in a case pending
in the District Court and participated in the trial without any
order of court permitting such appearance. He also used a
professional card of himself and partner advertising them-
selves as lawyers and giving their Denver office and phone
number. His name does not appear on the roll of attorneys
in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court of Colorado.
Held.-Respondent is guilty of practicing law in this
state without a license and without any authority and contrary
to the statutes in such case made and provided, and ordered
that he be confined in the County jail for twenty days unless
he shall sooner pay to the clerk of this Court the sum of $100.
ELECTIONS-MANDAMUS-CANVASS-CERTIFICATE OF ELEC-
TION JUDGES-No. 12751-People etc. vs. White, et al.-
Decided December 22, 1930.
Facts.-Vernon Pfeiffer sued out an alternative writ of
mandamus wherein it was charged that the canvassing board
of Teller County failed to properly certify the vote in a cer-
tain precinct; that the certified count of the judges delivered
to the canvassing board showed that relator, Pfeiffer, had re-
ceived 233 votes and his opponent for State Senator had re-
ceived 188 votes and that the canvassing board unlawfully
rejected the total as certified by such board and based their
computation solely upon the tally marks which showed 221
votes for opponent and 200 for Pfeiffer.
Held.-The canvassing board had no power to reject the
totals shown in words and figures as certified by the judges of
election and compute the total number of votes cast solely upon
the tally marks appearing opposite the names of each. It was
not the purpose of the general assembly to allow mere tally
marks, which are not certified, which contain nothing more
than strokes of pen or pencil with respect to the number of
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votes cast for any candidate and which can be readily changed,
to be taken as evidence sufficient to contradict the certificate.
Judgment reversed with directions.
JUDGMENTS- DEFAULT- SURPRISE- SETTING ASIDE -No.
12733-Calkins vs. Smalley-Decided December 22, 1930.
Facts.-Lower court denied motion of defendant to set
aside judgment. Defendant claimed that case stood at issue
for 17 months, when plaintiff's attorney attempted to serve
one W. M. Spaulding with trial notice which attorney refused
to accept, advising that he intended to withdraw. No other
notice was served and defendant had no notice or knowledge
that case was set for trial or that judgment had been entered
against him until after judgment. Defendant had employed
Spaulding as his regular attorney in this case and in other
matters and that Spaulding never informed him that the case
had been set for trial and that he was completely taken by
surprise.
Held.-The Court abused its discretion in not granting
the motion to vacate the judgment.
Judgment reversed.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-JUNIOR MORTGAGE-BANKRUPTCY-
No. 12290-Johnson vs. The National Sugar Manufactur-
ing Co. et al.-Decided, December 29, 1930.
Facts.-Johnson brought an action to recover money
judgment from The National Sugar Manufacturing Com-
pany on the theory that one, Rife, mortgaged sugar beet crop
to Johnson subject to a prior mortgage on the same crop to
National Sugar Manufacturing Company. In an action
against the mortgagor, the Sugar Company was garnished
and answered that it held the proceeds subject to Johnson's
mortgage, and Johnson demanded payment of his mortgage
from the Sugar Company. Thereafter Rife went into Bank-
ruptcy and Johnson filed his note and chattel mortgage in the
Bankruptcy Court and thereafter withdrew the claim. De-
fendant pleaded proceedings in Bankruptcy Court as res
judicata, and that the lien of the chattel mortgage had expired
because not extended and that the proceeds of the crop were
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lawfully in the custody of the Bankruptcy Court. Judgment
for defendant.
Held.-(1) Junior mortgagee of the property is en-
titled to any part of the proceeds remaining after satisfying
prior encumbrances.
(2) The complaint was for money had and received,
and was not an action in conversion.
(3) When one who has in his possession funds which
in equity and good conscience belong to another, the law
creates a promise to pay said funds to their owner, and in
case of refusal to do so, an action in assumpsit for money had
and received is a proper action to enforce payment.
(4) After the Sugar Company had paid itself the
amount due on its prior chattel mortgage, it became as to the
surplus a holder thereof for payment to those entitled thereto,
and its position as to such surplus being analogous to that of
a trustee.
(5) The withdrawal of the plaintiff's claim from the
Bankruptcy Court, after he had appeared therein, did not
preclude him from maintaining this action.
(6) The lien of the plaintiff's chattel mortgage was in
effect, on the date of plaintiff's demand and defendant's re-
fusal to pay, and it was at this time that plaintiff's cause of
action accrued.
Judgment reversed.
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER-EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES-
No. 12684-Walker, Ray, and Halliday vs. The People-
Decided January 5, 1931.
Facts.-Walker, Ray and Halliday were found guilty of
murder in the first degree, and the penalty was fixed at death.
The assignments of error presented: (1) The admission of
evidence of other crimes; (2) Court's refusal to give in-
structions tendered by defendants.
Held.- (1) Evidence of bank robbery preceding the
murder, to shooting immediately after, and to larceny of an
automobile occurring subsequent to the murder was properly
admissible, especially in view of the fact that the defendants
had made a confession embracing these matters, which was
admitted in evidence without objection.
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(2) Court's refusal to give instruction stating the pro-
cedure to be followed by peace officers in apprehending fugi-
tive criminals from other states was not error.
Judgment affirmed.
ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS-COMMON LAW
ASSIGNMENT-No. 12676-Damaskus, et al. vs. The Mc-
Carty-Johnson Heating and Engineering Co.-Decided
January 12, 1931.
Facts.-The Betsy Ross Cafe and Candy Company made
a common law assignment, admittedly insufficient under the
statute, for the benefit of its creditors, to one Mark Harrison,
who thereupon sold the property involved, to Damaskus and
others. Subsequently thereto, the McCarty-Johnson Heating
& Enginering Company secured a judgment against the Betsy
Ross Cafe and Candy Company, and a garnishee summons
was served upon Damaskus and others, who answered that
they had no property belonging to the Betsy Ross Cafe and
Candy Company. A traverse was filed, and from a judgment
of dismissal there was an appeal to the County Court, where
judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff and against
Damaskus and others. The Court held that the assignment
to Mark Harrison was void under the statute, and that he
took no title to the property involved.
Held.-The common law right to make an assignment
for the benefit of creditors is not abrogated by the statutory
proceeding relative to such assignment.
Judgment reversed.
CRIMINAL LAW-RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS-JOINT CHARGE
-No. 12528-Pauline Garcia vs. The People of the State
of Colorado-Decided January 12, 1931.
Facts.-Two persons were jointly charged and jointly
tried upon information charging them with feloniously re-
ceiving stolen goods. Both were convicted. The evidence
showed that only one of them directly received the goods.
Held.-1. One of the defendants' motion for separate
trial was insufficient, because it failed to set forth what the
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evidence was that that defendant claimed would be immaterial
and inadmissible against one of the defendants, although ma-
terial and admissible against the other.
2. The defendant against whom the evidence is im-
material and inadmissible is the only one who can make the
motion for a separate trial.
3. To sustain a joint charge of feloniously receiving
stolen goods, there must be a joint receipt at one and the same
time; and a receipt by one of the parties at one time and place,
and a subsequent receipt by the other at another time and
place will not support the joint charge; but will only support
and justify the conviction of the one who first received them.
Judgment reversed.
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